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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO TERMS
Andrew Wroe and Jon Herbert
George W. Bush left office on 20 January 2009. Many, perhaps most,
observers thought the country and world inherited by Barack Obama
were considerably less safe and prosperous than those Bush had
inherited eight years earlier. While most presidents, even two-term
ones, leave office with their reputations damaged, they rarely achieve
the level of opprobrium that clung to President Bush. Americans, in
a multitude of different polls, consistently rated him as one of the
country’s worst post-war presidents – and not without reason. 
1. SECOND TERM WOES
Bush started, and failed to end, wars and civil wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, at great human, financial and geopolitical cost. Tens of thousands
of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars were expended in a
hitherto unsuccessful attempt to rid the world of “terror”. Indeed,
many commentators and politicians, including Bush’s successor in the
White House, suggested that the war on terror was itself a primary
motivating factor radicalising elements, particularly fundamentalist
Islamists, already hostile to the United States, thus making the world
a more dangerous and unstable place. Even outside the two main
arenas of conflict, the security situation deteriorated in Europe, Asia
and the Middle East. The United Kingdom, Spain, Russia and its
satellites, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, China and Egypt, among others,
experienced large and deadly terrorist attacks after the instigation of
the war on terror. The Israel–Palestine conflict, both a cause and
consequence of instability and hostility, erupted again in 2008 with
great loss of life. During Bush’s tenure, governments friendly to the
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United States lost power or were threatened by their public’s hostility
to American actions (Spain, Pakistan, Turkey) while others used that
hostility to bolster, or hang on to, power (Iran, Syria, Cuba). Bush’s
foreign policy woes were not the result of bad luck or military failure,
argues Ralph in Chapter 6, but a strategic failure of the Bush doctrine. 
The world is now more hazardous, and critics claim Bush is to
blame. He is pilloried, too, for economic failures, none more so
than the global financial crisis. As Bush left office, government spend -
ing, the national debt, budget deficit and balance of trade were at
historically high peacetime levels. Unemployment was rising quickly,
the economy shrinking, banks failing and the motor industry on the
edge of bankruptcy. The economic environment had not looked so
perilous since the dark days of the Great Depression in the 1930s,
which ushered in several generations of Democratic Party dominance.
Moreover, the slumping stock market and falling house prices reduced
significantly the value of many Americans’ assets and retirement
funds. It is unsurprising that at the end of Bush’s last year in office,
according to Gallup’s polling, about 80 per cent of Americans thought
the economy was the most important problem facing the country, that
about 90 per cent thought it a bad time to find a good job, and that
not since Gallup started asked the question in the mid-1970s had
so many Americans felt so pessimistic about their current financial
situation. 
Wilson (Chapter 10), like many economists, is unsure precisely how
much Bush is to blame for the crisis which has its roots in the collapse
of the sub-prime mortgage market, but argues convincingly that
he made matters much worse by cutting taxes, borrowing heavily,
running large deficits and failing to invest during good times; by
deregulating the financial markets and failing to oversee risky new
financial instruments; by rigidly pursuing free-market solutions; and
by adopting a style of policymaking that discounted or ignored
professional, independent expert advice and discouraged debate over
alternative policy solutions. 
The irony of the Bush administration’s record on economic policy -
making is that the eventual outcome was diametrically opposed to the
original intention. Over the opposition of many recalcitrant members
of his own party in Congress, Bush spent his last months in office
overseeing the largest nationalisation programme in American history,
as major banks, and mortgage and insurance companies came under
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government control or majority ownership, at huge cost to the tax -
payer. Billions of dollars more were spent buying up toxic loans,
injecting liquidity into the financial markets, and propping up ailing
financial and industrial giants, including General Motors, Chrysler and
Ford. The American people turned against big business, especially its
overpaid executives whose remuneration packages and huge bonuses
seemed to bear no relation to their own or their companies’ perform -
ance. The collapse of some of America’s great corporate institutions –
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG – was
accompanied by the disintegration of the Washington consensus, the
neo-liberal belief in the sanctity of markets and their mechanisms,
which had increasingly dominated economic policymaking in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As Wilson notes, anyone
who had suggested prior to 2008 that the United States would witness
such a large-scale government intervention in the US economy and
the breakdown of the prevailing free-market ideology would have
been dismissed as a crank. That it happened on the watch and, to
some extent, at the behest of President Bush is even more remarkable.
Henry Paulson, Bush’s treasury secretary, called such intervention
“objectionable”, but advocated it anyway in the absence of any
realistic alternative. Clinton claimed the era of big government was
over; Bush brought it back. 
The economic crisis of Bush’s last year in office was preceded by a
series of failed attempts to reform public policy, most notably in the
areas of Social Security and immigration. Waddan (Chapter 11) shows
how the Bush administration badly miscalculated the prospects for
reform, underestimating the institutional and structural barriers and
overestimating its own persuasive talents. This failure early in the
second term undermined the administration’s political reputation
and public prestige. Together with the federal government’s wholly
inadequate response, both perceived and real, to Hurricane Katrina in
August 2005, the debacle over Social Security set the tone for Bush’s
remaining time in office. Katrina was particularly significant because it
symbolised in one photograph – Bush staring down on New Orleans
from Air Force One as he returned to Washington from his vacation –
the president’s alleged detachment from and disinterest in the plight
of fellow Americans on the ground. It also symbolised for some their
belief that the president was a man unable to empathise with the
suffering of others, with people less fortunate than himself. 
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Remarkably, Bush did not respond to the dramatic diminution in
his political capital by reigning in his legislative ambitions but, instead,
pushed on with so-called “comprehensive” immigration reform. In a
grand bargain, the status of up to ten million immigrants illegally
resident in the United States would be “regularised” or “legalised” but
the border would finally be closed to prevent the entry of any more.
To its opponents, the most ferocious being his own previously loyal
Republican lieutenants in the House of Representatives and social and
cultural conservatives in the country at large, the reform was nothing
less than an “amnesty” for lawbreakers. Bush genuinely believed that
immigration was part of America’s great story, and a significant force
for renewal, but this was not the reason he pursued liberal reform in
the face of bewildered opposition from his base. Rather, the main
impetus to immigration reform was that Bush and his political
svengali, Karl Rove, calculated that it would engender an electoral
realignment and allow the Republican Party to dominate American
politics for at least a generation. That monumental legacy would, they
thought, cement Bush’s place in history as a great Republican and a
great president. The reality is likely to be very different, as we discuss
in more detail in Chapter 16. 
2. FIRST TERM SUCCESSES
The many significant failures of Bush’s second term are intriguing
from both policy and political perspectives because they follow a
number of very important successes in his first term. It is usual for
presidents to do better in their first term, and the phenomenon of the
second-term lame-duck president is well known. What is notable in
George W. Bush’s case is the magnitude of the difference. The failures
and problems of the second term outlined above contrast sharply
against his first term successes, such as two of the three largest tax
cuts in American history, the most important education reform in
thirty-five years and the largest expansion of healthcare and most
wide-ranging reorganisation of the federal bureaucracy in a gener -
ation (see Singh, Chapter 2; Parker, Chapter 12; Hurst, Chapter 7).
Such dominance of the legislative agenda in domestic affairs is
unusual because presidents often struggle against the institutional
advantages of other actors and the established structures of power. Of
course, Bush also dominated the agenda on foreign affairs, especially
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after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, but his dominance in
this area is less remarkable than in domestic matters. 
Bush’s domestic policy triumphs are especially remarkable in part
because, as noted above, presidents often struggle to impose their
agendas but also because the political environment looked particularly
hostile when Bush was sworn in as president on 20 January 2001.
Bush did inherit from Bill Clinton a Republican Congress, but he did
nothing to enhance its majority during the 2000 cycle, and nor did its
GOP members feel they owed their seats to him. Indeed, Bush’s
electoral coat-tails were actually negative, as the Republicans lost two
seats in the House and five in the Senate, yielding a narrow majority
in the lower chamber and a 50–50 tie in the upper. Thanks to Vice
President Dick Cheney, the President of the Senate, and his deciding
vote in the event of a tie, the Republicans gained control of the Senate
with an effective majority of one. The situation was particularly prob -
lem atic given that the majority party usually requires a supermajority
(sixty votes) to push legislation to a vote in the Senate, and was made
worse when Republican Senator Jim Jeffords (Vermont) resigned the
party’s whip, declared himself an independent and started to caucus
with the Democrats, handing them formal control of the upper
chamber. Another seeming impediment to future legislative success
was that Bush could not claim, with any seriousness, a mandate for his
agenda. He lost the popular vote to Al Gore by some 500,000 votes
and sneaked a victory, the closest since 1876, in the electoral college
only thanks to the US Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush
v. Gore (2000) to award him Florida’s electoral college votes. He was in
many people’s and politicians’ eyes an illegitimate or, at best, wounded
president who would have to govern from the centre in a bipartisan
fashion. That he campaigned as a “uniter, not a divider” and a “com -
passionate conservative”, the right’s answer to Clinton’s “third way”,
suggested that he might. He did not. 
Moreover, despite the unpromising political environment at the
start of his presidency, the first term’s significant legislative successes
were accompanied by impressive electoral performances in 2002
and 2004. In contrast to most incumbent presidents, who are risk
averse and do not want to be associated with electoral defeat, Bush
campaigned hard for Republican candidates in the 2002 mid-term
congressional elections, putting his authority and prestige on the line
to enhance the party’s majority in the House and win back the Senate.
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On only three occasions in the twentieth century had the president’s
party won extra congressional seats, but the gamble paid off hand -
somely for Bush as Republicans took a further eight seats in the
House and two in the Senate to retake control. The elections of 2004
were equally satisfying for Republicans. The congressional party again
enhanced its majorities to thirty seats in the House and ten in the
Senate – the first time in seventy years the incumbent president’s
party had done so in both chambers. President Bush fought off the
challenge of Democratic Senator John Kerry and was re-elected on an
improved popular and electoral college vote. Success in 2002 and 2004
helped convince Bush of the efficacy of his electoral and governing
strategy, and thus to pursue it with renewed vigour in his second term.
History indicates it was the wrong choice, as we explain below. 
3. CAMPAIGNING TO GOVERN
The same strategy that had brought some impressive election victories
would undermine the second half of his presidency; the same strategy
that in his first term delivered many important policy successes during
a national security crisis created the resentments, tensions and
polarisation that precluded success in the second. That strategy was
governing by campaigning. On its own, it would have been prob -
lematic, but combined with Bush’s personal style and belief system,
it would prove ruinous (see Singh, Chapter 2; Maltese, Chapter 14;
Fullam and Gitelson, Chapter 15). Governing via a permanent cam -
paign requires presidents to present and sell their legislative priorities
directly to the American people who, in turn, directly or indirectly
pressurise members of Congress to support their passage. Going
public in this way is antithetical to the legislative strategies based
on persuasion and bargaining long advocated by most respected
presidential scholars, because it pressurises, even bullies, members of
Congress to support the executive’s position. 
Another element to governing by campaigning is that it is
polarising and frequently partisan. Public policy reform is a complex
business because the world is a complex place, but the president’s
policy solutions must be simplified for an inattentive and ill-informed
public. Other interested political actors will also boil down their
arguments to readily communicated sound bites as each tries to sell
them to the public. Once ideas are in the public domain and become
associated with various actors, however, positions become entrenched,
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and bargaining and compromise become more difficult because
shifting or abandoning publicly articulated positions could lead to a
loss of reputation and prestige. Just as in an electoral campaign, no
side will admit error or acknowledge that the other side may have a
good idea. Indeed, positions are often adopted because they are
different from, or in opposition to, the other party’s or because they
present the other party with awkward political decisions. Politics is
thus polarised, its partisan nature exacerbated. Campaigning is adver -
sarial while governing is best achieved via collaboration, and therefore
the permanent campaign mitigates against effective governance. 
Given these problems and the administration’s limited political
resources initially, it is perhaps surprising that the Bush administration
decided to engage in a permanent campaign. It is perhaps even more
surprising given that the administration sometimes adopted, at least
early in Bush’s presidency, a rival approach and often with consider -
able success. As Singh notes (Chapter 2), the president demonstrated
during his first term that he was a relatively skilled congressional
operator in terms of knowing which policy changes Congress was
capable of delivering, and he could be charming, funny, charismatic
and persuasive when meeting in private with members of Congress.
Indeed, two historic reforms in education (the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001) and healthcare (the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003)
were products of this bipartisan Bush (see Waddan, Chapter 11; Parker,
Chapter 12). The permanent campaign and the partisan polarisation it
wrought, then, were not inevitable but a choice the Bush adminis -
tration made and one that would come to serve them poorly. 
The decision to adopt the partisan strategy was probably influenced
by four interlinked factors. First, despite the inherent tension between
legislative bargaining and going public, all modern administrations
and some political scientists believe that presidents must make their
case directly to the people in an era in which Congress has atomised,
interest groups proliferated and trust declined. Second, Bush was not
unique in campaigning to govern but he did it more extensively than
any previous president in part because the strategy fitted his person -
ality and style. While he could be engaging and work in a bipartisan
fashion as he demonstrated throughout his tenure as governor of
Texas and early in his presidency, Bush liked to define himself as “the
decider”, a man who set the agenda making big decisions, holding
steady to them and refusing to countenance doubt. This style lent itself
to the simple certainties required by performance in the public arena.
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Conversely, he was uncomfortable with policy detail and parsing
options which, of course, are central to the alternative, bipartisan
approach to lawmaking. Third, governing by campaigning appeared to
work, and so was retained. For example, Bush’s first significant policy
triumph, the 2001 $1.3 trillion tax cut, was the product of a “partisan
budgetary strategy” argues Singh. Finally, and perhaps most import -
antly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks both increased the opportunity for, and
enhanced the effectiveness of, governing by campaigning, at least in
the short term. Crises centralise power vertically from the states to the
federal government and horizontally from the legislature to the execu -
tive, and 9/11 was no different in its consequences. Subsequently,
Bush deliberately made the war on terror the defining issue of his
presidency because of the legislative and electoral advantages it could
deliver for him specifically and Republicans generally. The security
climate made opposing the president very difficult, even on issues
only tangentially related to security. National security trumped all
other cards and, of course, the administration worked very hard to
make sure that it was defined and controlled by the White House and
the Republican Party. Moreover, Bush was equally content to override
states’ rights arguments and impose the federal government’s will
when it suited the administration (Vile, Chapter 5). His was not an
administration in the conservative, small-government tradition. 
The Bush administration’s permanent campaign was allied to a
sophisticated, professional communications organisation and strategy
(Maltese, Chapter 14) and a “fifty-plus-one” electoral and legislative
strategy (Fullam and Gitelson, Chapter 15). The aim was to mobilise
the party’s base, especially culturally conservative Christian voters, to
win elections (Ashbee, Chapter 13), and to maintain strong party
discipline in Congress to win key votes. It was also allied to an
arrogant, perhaps unconstitutional, exercise of executive power
(Pfiffner, Chapter 3) that alienated many moderates in Congress.
Denying “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay the protection of
the international laws of war, spying on American citizens without
judicial oversight, and making war in Iraq without reference to expert
testimony are a few of the many examples in the following chapters
of the Bush administration’s dismissive approach to the institutional
restraints on the executive branch. 
Bush’s style and strategy engendered no reservoir of good will when
events turned against him, especially when the might of the US armed
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forces failed to win the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the US
Supreme Court, traditionally subservient to executive excesses during
crisis or war and mute during Bush’s first term, spoke out in the
second term in support of the rights of enemy combatants, despite
Bush having pushed the Court to the right with two new appoint -
ments (Long, Chapter 4). Internationally, too, Bush was shunned,
invading Iraq without United Nations support and in the face of
huge demonstrations by citizens around the world. Defense secretary
Donald Rumsfeld antagonised many foreign leaders with his remarks
about “old Europe”, but his statement was emblematic of the divide
between America and its traditional allies and of the administration’s
lack of concern about what others thought of it or wanted (Houghton,
Chapter 8). In the realm of liberalising international trade, too, the
administration largely failed to promote multilateral agreements. The
alternative strategy of pursuing bilateral and regional agreements had
the unhappy result – at least as far as the administration was con -
cerned – of provoking increased congressional activity and resistance
in the area (Chorev, Chapter 9). 
In sum, the Bush administration achieved many significant
successes during its first term, despite an ostensible lack of political
capital, but the strategy responsible for most of these was itself the
major cause of the second term’s failures, of which there were many.
What had appeared a strong, successful but polarising presidency
unravelled as the permanent campaign malfunctioned as a governing
strategy. Bush’s presidency came to an ignoble end with the economy
crashing and the country’s military engagements unresolved. With
Democrats taking control of the legislature and executive in 2009,
earlier talk about a Republican electoral realignment and historic
legacy looked foolish in retrospect. On his exit from office, the
American public rated Bush harshly. It is possible that in the court of
history his reputation will be revived – perhaps if his foreign adven -
tures produce democratic and stable regimes or if his government’s
massive economic intervention provides the foundation for a solid
recovery – just as Truman is today held in much higher esteem than
when he left office. As we conclude in the final chapter of this volume,
our best guess is that this is unlikely, with the first term’s successes
buried deep below the second term’s failures in the nation’s collective
memory. 
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